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AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2004 NADER BALLOT
ACCESS FEDERAL COURT CASES
Richard Winger *
“In America, it is vital that every vote count and that every vote be
counted.” John Kerry, concession speech of November 3, 2004. 1
“Be it further resolved that: The Democratic Party of the United States
recognizes the right to vote as the most fundamental of all rights in our
democracy. And no duty of the Party is more important than protecting
the sanctity of this right.” Resolution passed by the 1984 Democratic
National Convention.
“It is to be expected that a voter hopes to find on the ballot a candidate
who comes near to reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary
issues.” 2

INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1968, federal courts have generally protected the ability of
voters to cast votes for minor party and presidential candidates if those
candidates were significant enough to obtain regular coverage by major
daily newspapers and national television networks. George Wallace,
Eugene McCarthy, John B. Anderson, Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader (in
2000) were all placed on the ballot of various states by federal court
injunctions, as this article will show. 3 However, in 2004, Ralph Nader
failed to get injunctive relief from any federal court in his eight federal
ballot access or vote-counting cases, which were filed against certain

*

Editor of Ballot Access News since 1985; B.A., Political Science, U.C. Berkeley 1965; has
testified in ballot access constitutional lawsuits in thirty states, and is on the Editorial Board
of Election Law Journal.
1. Richard Stevenson, After a Tense Night, Bush Spends the Day Basking in Victory,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P3.
2. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
3. George Wallace won his ballot access lawsuit against Ohio on October 15, 1968.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968). There was no precedent holding that the
Constitution protects ballot access for minor parties or independent candidates. See id. at 32
(relying on other types of Equal Protection cases to determine if the State can keep minority
parties off the ballot).
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election officials in Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, North Carolina (two cases),
Ohio (two cases), and Texas. This article discusses each of Nader’s 2004
federal ballot access cases. 4 These cases are grouped by issue: a) whether a
state petition deadline is unconstitutionally early; b) whether a state
requirement concerning the number of signatures is discriminatory; c)
whether a state restriction on who can circulate a petition is
unconstitutionally restrictive; and d) miscellaneous other issues. This
Article concludes that Nader’s 2004 federal ballot access cases had merit,
and that the federal courts which heard these cases defied precedent, and
made errors of both fact and law when they denied relief to voters who
wished to vote for Nader. This Article’s conclusion also shows that denial
of injunctive relief completely disenfranchised tens of thousands of voters
in the presidential election.
I. NADER’S INABILITY TO WIN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM FEDERAL
COURTS
Ever since 1968, when the Supreme Court ordered Ohio to place George
Wallace’s name on its presidential ballot, 5 the federal courts have protected
ballot access for whichever minor party or independent presidential
candidate was running third, if the candidate was prominently mentioned in
the news media and needed help from courts to get on ballots.6 In 1976,
federal courts, including the Supreme Court itself, issued injunctions
requiring ten states (Delaware,7 Florida, 8 Illinois, 9 Kansas, 10 Louisiana, 11
Michigan, 12 Missouri, 13 Nebraska, 14 Texas, 15 and Vermont)16 to list
4. This Article does not discuss Nader’s federal ballot access cases in Michigan and
New Mexico, since they were rendered mooted by decisions of state courts placing Nader
on the ballot in those two states. Those two cases were Gladstone v. Vigil-Giron, CV-041078 (D.N.M. Sept. 28, 2004), and Nader v. Land, No. 04-CV-72830 (E.D. Mich. July 27,
2004). Any blanket statements about “all” of Nader’s federal ballot access cases in this
article do not include these two cases.
5. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 34.
6. There were no independent or minor party presidential candidates who were covered
by the major newspapers or television networks in the presidential elections of 1972, 1984,
and 1988.
7. McCarthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (D. Del. 1976).
8. McCarthy v. Askew, 540 F.2d 1254, 1255 (5th Cir. 1976).
9. McCarthy v. Lunding, No. 76-C-2733 (N.D. Ill. September 7, 1976) (on file with
author).
10. McCarthy v. Shanahan, No. 76-237-C6 (D. Kan. June 17, 1976) (on file with
author).
11. McCarthy v. Hardy, 420 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E.D. La. 1976).
12. McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Mi. 1976).
13. McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
14. McCarthy v. Exon, 424 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D. Neb. 1976).
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Eugene McCarthy on November ballots. In 1980, federal courts issued
injunctions requiring eight states (Florida, 17 Georgia, 18 Kentucky, 19
Maine, 20 Maryland, 21 New Mexico, 22 North Carolina, 23 and Ohio24) to list
John B. Anderson and his running mate on their ballots. In 1992,
independent candidate Ross Perot attained ballot status in all fifty states
without needing to sue any state elections officials. In 1996, federal courts
ruled in favor of ballot access (in time for the election) for Ross Perot’s
Reform Party and its national ticket in Arkansas, 25 Florida, 26 and Maine.27
In 2000, Nader won injunctions in federal court putting him on the ballot in
Illinois 28 and West Virginia. 29 Also in 2000, he won declaratory, but not
injunctive relief, in South Dakota. 30
In stark contrast, in 2004 Nader sought but failed to get injunctive relief
from lower federal courts in six states: Arizona, 31 Hawaii, 32 Illinois, 33
North Carolina, 34 Ohio, 35 and Texas. 36 He also failed to obtain injunctive
15. McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317, 1323-24 (1976).
16. McCarthy v. Salmon, No. 76-213 (D. Vt. Oct. 7, 1976) (on file with author).
17. Anderson v. Firestone, 499 F. Supp. 1027, 1030-31 (N.D. Fla. 1980).
18. Anderson v. Poythress, No. C80-1671A (N.D. Ga 1980) (on file with author).
19. Greaves v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283, 289 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
20. Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D. Me. 1980).
21. Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d 55, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1980).
22. Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898, 905 (D.N.M. 1980).
23. Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 309 (4th Cir. 1980).
24. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D. Ohio 1980). Ohio asked the
U.S. Supreme Court to overturn this decision and to bypass the Sixth Circuit, but the
Supreme Court refused on August 15, 1980 in Celebrezze v. Anderson, 448 U.S. 914 (1980).
25. Citizens to Establish a Reform Party in Ark. v. Priest, 970 F. Supp. 690, 700-01
(E.D. Ark. 1996).
26. Libertarian Party of Fla. v. Mortham, No. 4:96-CV258-RH (N.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 1996).
27. Citizens to Establish a Me. Reform Party v. Diamond, No. 96-CV-24 (D. Me. 1996).
In this case, the state capitulated before the court could rule on the matter.
28. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 00-C-4401 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (on file with author).
29. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. v. Hechler, 112 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580 (S.D. W. Va.
2000).
30. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. v. Hazeltine, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1209 (D.S.D.
2000).
31. Nader v. Brewer, No. 04-1699 (D. Az. Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with author); aff’d,
386 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 2004).
32. Nader v. Yoshina, No. 04-611 (D. Hi. Oct. 13, 2004) (on file with author).
33. Nader v. Keith, No. 04 C 4913, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16660 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23,
2004); aff’d, 385 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2004).
34. Nader v. Bartlett, No. 5:04-cv-675-BR (E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2004) (on file with
author).
35. Blankenship v. Blackwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 911, 924 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
36. Nader v. Connor, 332 F. Supp. 2d 982, 992 (W.D. Tex. 2004); aff’d, 388 F.3d 137
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relief from the Supreme Court in Ohio, 37 Oregon, 38 and Pennsylvania,39 in
appeals from adverse decisions of federal and state courts. Justice Stephen
Breyer was the only federal judge who gave Nader’s ballot access any
support whatsoever, and cast the sole vote on that court to grant injunctive
relief to Nader in Oregon. 40 Nader’s ballot access cases were in front of
the entire Seventh Circuit, 41 three judges in the Ninth Circuit,42 three
judges in the Sixth Circuit,43 three judges in the Fifth Circuit, 44 and eight
district court judges. 45
At this point, the reader may wonder if perhaps the Nader ballot access
cases of 2004 lacked merit. Despite suggestions to the contrary, Nader’s
2004 federal ballot access cases enjoyed considerable merit. This Article
will attempt to show that the decisions of federal courts in 2004 to deny
Nader injunctive relief violated precedents, committed serious factual
errors, and were of poor quality. In sharp contrast to the behavior of
federal courts in the 2004 Nader cases, state courts ruled in favor of ballot
access for Nader in eleven states: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. 46 Nader failed to obtain injunctive relief in state court in
only five states: Hawaii, 47 Illinois, 48 Ohio, 49 Oregon, 50 and Pennsylvania. 51
(5th Cir. 2004).
37. The Supreme Court denied injunctive relief on October 24, 2004 in Blankenship v.
Blackwell, 125 S. Ct. 375 (2004).
38. The Supreme Court denied injunctive relief on September 28, 2004 in Kucera v.
Bradbury, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
39. The Supreme Court denied injunctive relief on October 23, 2004 in Nader v. Serody,
125 S. Ct. 375 (2004).
40. Richard Winger, 16 Wins, 9 Losses in Ballot Access Cases, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS,
Oct. 3, 2004, at http://www.ballot-access.org/2004/1003.html. Breyer’s vote was cast on
September 28, 2004. See Kucera, 125 S. Ct. at 27.
41. Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2004). Nader asked for an en banc
rehearing in the Seventh Circuit, which was denied on October 15, 2004. Nader v. Keith,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22473 (7th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004).
42. Nader v. Brewer, 386 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying Nader the injunctive
relief he requested).
43. Blankenship v. Blackwell, No. 04-4259 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 2004) (denying Nader the
injunctive relief he requested) (on file with author).
44. Nader v. Connor, 388 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying Nader the injunctive relief
he requested).
45. The eight district judges were Frederick J. Martone of Arizona, David Alan Ezra of
Hawaii, Matthew F. Kennelly of Illinois, Frank W. Bullock, Jr. and W. Earl Britt of North
Carolina, Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. and George C. Smith of Ohio, and Lee Yeakel of Texas.
Five of the judges were appointees of Republican presidents, and three were Democratic
appointees.
46. For a discussion of cases decided in favor of granting Nader ballot access in these
states, see Winger, supra note 40.
47. Nader v. Yoshina, No. 04-00611 (D. Hi. Oct. 13, 2004) (on file with author).
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II. NADER’S CASES AGAINST TOO-EARLY PETITION DEADLINES
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled in Anderson v. Celebrezze 52 that early
petition deadlines for non-major party presidential candidates are
unconstitutional. Part II of that decision discusses the injury to voting
rights imposed by such deadlines; Part III discusses the state interests in an
early deadline. Applying a balancing test, the decision concludes that the
harm done to voting rights by early petition deadlines is substantial,
whereas the harm done to state interests by a later deadline is not
substantial. 53
The Court depended on American history for its conclusion that voting
rights are substantially infringed by early deadlines, and quoted extensively
from historian Alexander Bickel.54 Throughout America’s history, voters
dissatisfied with the major party national nominees and platforms have
transferred their interest and support to new parties and independent
candidates. The Republican Party was formed on July 6, 1854, 55 in
response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act having been signed into law in May
1854. 56 The Progressive Party of 1912 was not organized until August, 57
after Theodore Roosevelt had been denied the Republican Party nomination
in June. 58 Independent Progressive candidate Robert La Follette did not
decide to run for president until July 4, 1924, after it became apparent that
the Democratic Party national convention was not going to nominate
William G. McAdoo, the favorite candidate of the progressive movement
that year. 59 Strom Thurmond did not decide to run for president until midJuly 1948, after the Democratic national convention passed a Civil Rights
plank. 60
Starting in 1972, most states provided the Democratic and Republican

48. Nader v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 819 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
49. Blankenship v. Blackwell, 817 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 2004).
50. Kucera v. Bradbury, 97 P.3d 1191 (Or. 2004) (on file with author).
51. In re Nader, No. J-211-2004 (Pa. Oct. 19, 2004) (on file with author).
52. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
53. Id. at 806.
54. See, e.g., id. at 805.
55. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 202 (1958) (“Republican Party”).
56. MICHAEL F. HOLT, RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY 822 (1999).
57. Roosevelt Named Shows Emotion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1912, at 1.
58. Taft Renomiated By The Republican Convention, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1912, at 1.
59. Follette Agrees To Lead The Fight For Progressives, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1924, at 1.
60. W.H. Lawrence, Truman, Barkley Named By Democrats; South Loses on Civil
Rights; President Will Recall Congress July 26, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1948, at 1; John N.
Popham, Southerners Name Thurmond To Lead Anti-Truman Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1948, at 1.
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Parties with their own presidential primaries, and it became common for
the identity of major party presidential nominees to be predictable by April
(as of 1980), 61 and even by March (by 1988). 62 It continued to be true,
however, that major party vice-presidential nominees, and party platforms,
were often not known until the July and August, national party
conventions. Even in 2004, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate was
not known until July 6, when John Kerry announced that his choice would
be John Edwards. 63 Also, the Democratic Party’s position on the Iraq war
was unclear until its national convention, held July 26-29. Therefore, the
logic employed in Anderson v. Celebrezze continued to be valid, even into
2004.
By 1988, all states except Texas had moved their petition deadlines for
non-major party presidential candidates to the months of July, August or
September. 64 Texas’s petition deadlines for new parties and independents
had been in July, or even later, since that state had first created
government-printed ballots in 1903. 65 In 1986, however, the state had
moved its first primary from May to March. 66 This had the indirect effect
of moving the new party petition deadline to late May, and the independent
petition to early May. This is because the Texas deadline law was worded
in terms of a specified number of days after the primary. By contrast, most
states wrote their laws in terms of a specified number of days prior to the
November election. With all other states having their deadlines in July,
August, or September, it seemed obvious that Texas’s newly created May
deadline was not only sharply deviant from the remainder of the nation, but

61. Robert Dallek, RONALD REAGAN: THE POLITICS OF SYMBOLISM 56 (1984). Ronald
Reagan, having won the Illinois Republican presidential primary on March 18 and the
Wisconsin and Kansas primaries on April 1, seemed unstoppable.
62. There was consensus that Michael Dukakis had captured the Democratic nomination
on the basis of his strong showings on “Super Tuesday,” March 8, 1988. Buoyed by this
consensus, Michael Dukakis did not lose any primaries after March 15, except for the
District of Columbia primary on May 3 won by Jesse Jackson. For the chronological list of
presidential primary results, see RICHARD M. SCAMMON & ALICE V. MCGILLIVRAY,
AMERICA VOTES 20: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ELECTION STATISTICS 61
(1992). Similarly, George H. W. Bush was considered the certain nominee after Super
Tuesday, and his momentum from Super Tuesday brought him victory in all the following
primaries that year.
63. Kerry’s Choice, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A1.
64. For a list of these deadlines, see BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Apr. 19, 1988, at 2.
65. The original 1903 law, required new parties to nominate by convention during
August, and certify their nominees before the end of August. 1903 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
101 (Vernon). A 1905 amendment, ch. 11, sec. 94, p. 541, set up petition procedures for
independent candidates, due thirty days after the run-off primary. 1905 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 11 (Vernon).
66. 1986 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 14 (Vernon).
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probably unconstitutional as well. If Texas had had such an early deadline
in 1948, for example, Strom Thurmond could not have gained a place on
the ballot, and the 9.1% of Texas voters who voted for him67 would have
had to resort to casting a write-in vote.
In the period 1988-2000, however, no independent presidential candidate
sued Texas over its May petition deadline. No independent presidential
candidate attempted to qualify in Texas in 1988. Ross Perot qualified as
an independent in Texas in 1992 and 1996, and Pat
Buchanan qualified in 2000. Ross Perot had launched his first presidential
bid on February 20, 1992, 68 and had such huge popularity that spring that
he was able to comply with the May deadline. Pat Buchanan had launched
his Reform/independent bid on October, 25, 1999, 69 and since he received
$4,022,171 in primary season matching funds during the period January
through August 2000, 70 he was able to hire paid circulators to complete his
Texas petition by the early May deadline.
In 1993, Arizona moved its independent petition deadline from
September to June. 71 The Arizona primary continued to be in midSeptember, 72 so it was obvious that the June deadline was not needed for
election administration-related reasons. In 1999, Illinois moved its
deadline from August to late June.73
In 2004, Nader tried to meet the Arizona and Illinois June deadlines, but
he came up 550 signatures short in Arizona, 74 and 4818 signatures short in
Illinois. 75 His supporters obtained additional signatures in each state and
submitted them, but these supplemental signatures were rejected because
they were beyond the June deadlines. Nader sued both states, believing
that June petition deadlines were unconstitutional under Anderson v.

67. SVEND PETERSEN, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS 104 (1963).
68. BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Mar. 30, 1992, at 4. The announcement, made on Larry
King’s interview program, was coy and indirect; Perot said he would run if his supporters
successfully placed him on the ballot in all fifty states. By mid-March, that petition effort
was well underway.
69. See BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Nov. 1, 1999, at http://www.ballotaccess.org/1999/1101.html.
70. See BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Sept. 1, 2000, at http://www.ballotaccess.org/2000/0901.html. Buchanan also received approximately $12,000,000 in general
election campaign funds in September 2000.
71. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 98.
72. In 2004, the Arizona primary was on September 7. Arizona Revised Statutes section
16-201 sets the primary date on the eighth Tuesday before the general election.
73. 1999 Ill. Laws 91-317.
74. Nader v. Brewer, No. 04-1699 (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2004).
75. Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Celebrezze. He had precedent on his side. All independent presidential
petition deadlines that had been tested in court since Anderson v.
Celebrezze, that were earlier than July 15, had been invalidated,76 with one
peculiar exception. 77
Nader had further reason to believe that the Illinois June deadline was
unconstitutional, because Nader’s own 2000 ballot access lawsuit against
Illinois’s deadline had won injunctive relief. Nader had sued Illinois in
2000 over the early deadline. He had come up short by 2000 signatures,
continued to collect more after the deadline, and won a federal court
injunction, requiring the State Board of Elections to accept the late
signatures. 78 After he got on the Illinois ballot in 2000, however, his
attorneys never returned to court to secure declaratory relief.
Nader also had reason to believe the Texas deadline was
unconstitutional. Due to an anomaly in the Texas law, the independent
presidential petition in 2004 was due on May 10, 79 whereas the petition to
qualify a new political party was not due until May 24. Even setting aside
the general point that May 10 seemed too early to pass muster under
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 80 there was the additional point that requiring an
independent presidential candidate to submit signatures two weeks before
minor parties must do so, is irrational and discriminatory. Additionally, in

76. These cases were from Indiana (Warrick v. Condre, No. IP-83-810-C, (S.D. Ind.
1983)), Kansas (Merritt v. Graves, No. 87-4264-R (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 1988)), Massachusetts
(Serrette v. Connolly, No. 68172 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. June 27, 1985) (on file with author)),
Nevada (Fulani v. Lau, No. CV-N-92-535 (D. Nev. 1992) (on file with author)), New Jersey
(LaRouche v. Burgio, 594 F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1984)), Pennsylvania (Libertarian Party of
Pa. v. Davis, No. 84-0262 (M.D. Pa. June 1, 1984) (on file with author)), and Utah
(LaRouche v. Monson, 599 F. Supp. 621 (D. Utah 1984)).
77. In 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court had reversed the State Court of Appeals, and
upheld Arizona’s June deadline, on the grounds that the plaintiff, Libertarian nominee Harry
Browne, had not filed his signatures until August 22. Browne v. Bayless, 46 P.3d 416, 417
(Ariz. 2002). The court seemed influenced by the fact that the Arizona Libertarian Party
was a qualified party in Arizona, yet the state party officers had refused to certify Browne as
the Libertarian nominee because of an intra-party squabble. See id. This necessitated that
Browne complete an independent petition, even though he was not a true independent
candidate. See id.
78. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 00-C-4401 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 25, 2000) (on file with author).
79. Texas Election Code Annoted section 192.032(c) (2004) sets the independent
presidential petition deadline as the second Monday of May. Section 181.005(a) sets the
new party petition deadline at seventy-five days after the precinct conventions. Section
174.022(a) sets precinct conventions on primary day, and section 41.007(a) sets primary
election day on the first Tuesday of March. Seventy-five days beyond the first Tuesday is
always a Sunday, so the actual deadline defaults to the following Monday.
80. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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2004 new parties needed 45,540 signatures, 81 and independent candidates
for other statewide office needed 45,540 82 as well, yet presidential
independents needed 64,076. 83 Nader submitted 80,044 signatures84 in
Texas on May 24, the deadline for minor parties. Although he had missed
the independent deadline, he felt confident that he could prevail in court
against the May 10 deadline. All relevant legal precedent confirmed that
states could not require earlier petition deadlines for independent
candidates than for new parties. 85
Notwithstanding the legal precedent, Nader failed to win injunctive
relief against the deadline in all three of his cases. In Texas, the district
court judge ruled that, relative to new parties (which had a petition deadline
of May 24, which Nader met), the May 10 deadline is not discriminatory
because the presidential nominees of minor parties must file a declaration
of candidacy on January 2. 86 The district court was factually mistaken.
The Texas law requiring minor party nominees to file a declaration of
candidacy in January does not apply to presidential candidates. 87
81. Nader v. Connor, 332 F. Supp. 2d 982, 984 (W.D. Tex. 2004). Texas Election Code
Annoted section 181.006(b)(2) requires new parties to submit a number of signatures equal
to one percent of the previous gubernatorial vote.
82. Texas Election Code Annoted section 142.007(1) requires statewide independent
candidates who are running for office other than president to submit a number of signatures
equal to one percent of the previous gubernatorial vote.
83. Nader, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 984. Texas Election Code Annoted section 192.032(d)
requires presidential independent candidates to submit a number of signatures equal to one
percent of the previous presidential vote received in that state. Since Texas elects its
governors in mid-term congressional election years, and since the turnout is invariably far
lower in mid-term years than in presidential years, independent presidential candidates
invariably need far more signatures than new parties and non-presidential independent
candidates need. In 2004, the presidential independent petition required forty-one percent
more signatures than the other two types of petitions.
84. Nader, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 985. The Texas Secretary of State, using random
sampling, determined that between 56,215 and 63,374 signatures were valid. Id. at 985
n.10. Because this was slightly less than the independent presidential requirement, Nader
sued to overturn the number of signatures for independents, as well as the independent
candidate deadline. See id. at 985 for these numbers.
85. See Cromer v. South Carolina, 917 F.2d 819, 824 (4th Cir. 1990); Greaves v. N.C.
Bd. of Elections, 508 F. Supp. 78, 83 (E.D.N.C. 1980); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F.
Supp. 366, 375 (W.D. Miss. 1976). No precedent contradicts these cases.
86. Nader, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
87. Texas Election Code Annoted section 181.031, applies to “a convention held under
this chapter,” and the relevant chapter does not include presidential conventions. The author
discussed this with Melinda Nickless, Assistant Director of Elections of Texas, on
September 2, 2004 and she agreed that presidential candidates of minor or new parties never
need file a declaration of candidacy with Texas. The national convention officers do certify
the names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates after those national
conventions are held, and they may be held as late as September 2. Michael Badnarik,
Libertarian presidential nominee in 2004, told the author that he did not file any declaration
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The district court also said that May 10 is not too early, because
presidential nominees of the major parties are now known as early as
March. 88 Even when Anderson v. Celebrezze was decided in 1983,
however, the major party nominees were known as early as April. On
April 23, 1980, supporters of John Anderson filed petitions in New Jersey
allowing him to run as an independent candidate in that state,89 because it
was already settled at that point that Ronald Reagan would be the
Republican nominee.
Nader appealed the Texas decision to the Fifth Circuit. At oral
argument, counsel for Nader clearly established that no declaration of
candidacy is required for minor party presidential nominees, and counsel
for the state of Texas acknowledged this point. Nevertheless, two days
after the hearing, the Fifth Circuit summarily affirmed the district court
decision, without writing its own decision or acknowledging the factual
error in the district court’s opinion. 90
In Illinois, Nader also failed to win injunctive relief, even though, as
noted above, he had won injunctive relief against that same deadline in
2000. The 2004 district court decision stated that the Supreme Court had
upheld an early July petition deadline in American Party of Texas v. White,
and the Illinois deadline is only fourteen days earlier than the Texas
deadline upheld in American Party of Texas. 91 It is true that the Supreme
Court upheld the whole Texas statutory scheme as it had existed in 1972, 92
but the plaintiff American Party had not failed to get on the 1972 Texas
ballot because of the deadline, nor did it allege that the deadline was the
cause of its failure to qualify. 93 Furthermore, the other two political partyplaintiffs in that case, La Raza Unida Party and the Socialist Workers
Party, had actually qualified for the 1972 Texas ballot (they had sued
before they realized they would succeed). 94 Therefore, the Supreme Court
had not specifically addressed the Texas petition deadline in its 1974
decision, and this holding should not control the Illinois Nader decision.
of candidacy with Texas.
88. Nader, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
89. New Jersey Petitions List Anderson as Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1980, at
A22.
90. Nader v. Connor, 388 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2004).
91. Nader v. Keith, No. 04 C 4913, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16660, at *19-20 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 23, 2004) (citing Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 787 (1974)).
92. Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 793-94.
93. The American Party’s Jurisdictional Statement to the U.S. Supreme Court, at 3 (on
file with author), complains about the number of signatures, the notarization requirement,
the short time for collecting signatures, the prohibition on primary voters signing the
petition, but does not complain that the deadline is too early.
94. Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 770 n.2.
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Furthermore, Anderson v. Celebrezze is nine years more recent than
American Party of Texas. Finally, in Mandel v. Bradley, 95 Justice John
Paul Stevens had specifically warned lower courts not to make the mistake
of assuming that the Supreme Court’s ballot access rulings earlier than
1977 should be read to settle the deadline issue.
The district court’s order in Illinois in 2004 did not even acknowledge
that another district court in Illinois had issued an injunction against the
same deadline in 2000.
Nader appealed his 2004 loss to the Seventh Circuit. 96 The Seventh
Circuit seemed to think Nader’s complaint had some validity. It noted,
One hundred thirty-four days—almost four and a half months—seems
awfully long. Too long, seems to be the judgment of 47 of the other 49
states. A 120-day deadline was upheld in American Party of Texas v.
White, but it had not been separately challenged and it was not separately
discussed. 97

It also stated,
But is it reasonable to require that the required number of nominating
petitions all be collected by June 21 when the election is not until
November 2? June 21 preceded both major parties’ conventions, and
depending on what occurred there a third-party candidacy might generate
a degree of support that it could not have attracted earlier. The problem is
that time has to be allowed between the deadline for petitions and the
election to enable challenges to the validity of the petitions to be made
and adjudicated. 98

The Seventh Circuit seemed to be wavering, but finally denied
injunctive relief for Nader on the grounds that he had filed his lawsuit too
late. 99 This seems, however, unfair. Nader had filed his lawsuit on June
27, 2004, 100 soon after his petition had been rejected. By contrast, George
Wallace had not filed his lawsuit against the Ohio ballot access laws until
July 29, 1968, 101 and yet the Supreme Court put him on the ballot. 102 Also,
Eugene McCarthy had not filed his lawsuit against the Texas ballot access
laws until July 30, 1976, 103 and the Supreme Court put him on the ballot.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

432 U.S. 177, 180 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 736.
Id.
See Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35 (1968).
See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 539 F.2d 1353, 1354 (5th Cir. 1976).
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The Seventh Circuit cited no precedent for its conclusion that Nader filed
the case too late.
Nader failed to gain injunctive relief against the Arizona deadline
because he filed the lawsuit too late. He had filed it August 16, 104 and it
was not decided until September 10, when relief was denied orally from the
bench. 105 Although this conclusion seems reasonable on its face, it fails to
acknowledge that Arizona didn’t hold its primary (for office other than
president) until September 7. 106 On September 10, the day of Nader’s
hearing, the official canvass for the primary had not yet been completed, so
it was obvious that the November ballots were not yet being printed. Also,
note that Nader won nine of his ballot access lawsuits in state courts during
the period September 15 through October 8 (see footnotes 45 through 55).
If Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico,
Washington, and West Virginia were able to cope with pro-Nader court
decisions in the second half of September and even the first eight days in
October, it was not’ too late for judicial relief in Arizona.
III. NADER’S LAWSUITS AGAINST A DISCRIMINATORY NUMBER OF
SIGNATURES
Nader filed lawsuits against Hawaii and Texas for laws that required
substantially more signatures for independent presidential candidates, than
for new parties.107 Each case also contained a second distinct claim, that it
is unconstitutional for a state to require more signatures for an independent
presidential candidate than for independent candidates for other statewide
office. Under all prior rulings, these cases should have been successful, but
they did not. 108 Nader failed to get injunctive relief in Hawaii,109 and in
Texas, he lost both injunctive and declaratory relief.110
In Hawaii, an independent candidate for president in 2004 needed 3711

104. Complaint, Nader v. Brewer, No. 04-1699 (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with
author).
105. Nader v. Brewer, No. 04-1699 (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2004).
106. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-201 (West 2004) (setting the primary on the eighth
Tuesday before the general election).
107. See the discussion of Nader v. Connor, 388 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Tex. 2004),
supra Part II. The Hawaii case is Nader v. Yoshina, CV04-611 (D. Hi. Oct. 13, 2004).
108. Greaves v. State Bd. of Elections, 508 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.N.C. 1980); DeLaney v.
Bartlett, No. 1:02CV00741 (M.D.N.C. July 26, 2004) (on file with author); Cromer v. South
Carolina, 917 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1990); Danciu v. Glisson, 302 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1974);
Patton v. Camp, No. 92V-885-N (M.D. Al. Aug. 31, 1992) (on file with author).
109. Nader v. Yoshina, No. CV-04-00611 (D. Hi. Oct. 13, 2004).
110. Nader v. Connor, 332 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Tx. 2004), aff’d, 388 F.3d 137 (5th
Cir. 2004).
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signatures. 111 A new party (entitled to its own primary, and the ability to
nominate someone for every partisan office in the state) only needed 677
signatures. 112 An independent candidate for statewide office other than
president only needed 25 signatures. 113 Nader believed he submitted more
than 3711 valid signatures, but the state Elections Office ruled against him.
Even though Nader’s campaign believed it proved that the state was wrong,
it failed to gain any relief in state administrative proceedings on that claim.
So, it filed a federal lawsuit alleging that it is unconstitutional to require so
many more signatures for Nader than for an independent candidate for
other statewide office, or an entire new party. Every precedent was on
Nader’s side. 114
But the district court in Hawaii denied injunctive relief on the grounds
that, as the Court read it, American Party of Texas v. White, compelled a
different result. Texas, in 1972, had required a petition signed by one
percent of the last gubernatorial vote to place a new party on the statewide
ballot. 115 Alternatively, a new party could qualify in just a single county (if
it could not’ qualify statewide, or did not’ wish to) with a petition signed by
three percent of the last gubernatorial vote within that county. A new party
could not qualify in a single congressional or legislative district.
Also in Texas in 1972, an independent candidate for statewide office,
even president, needed a petition of one percent of the last gubernatorial
vote. Independent candidates for district office needed a petition signed by
three percent of the last gubernatorial vote, if the district encompassed
more than a single county. Independent candidates for district office within
a single county needed a petition of five percent of the last gubernatorial
vote in that district. No independent candidate for any district or county
office, however, ever needed more than 500 signatures.
The district court in Hawaii misread American Party of Texas v. White.
The Hawaii court wrote, “In American Party of Texas, the Supreme Court
determined that the requirement of the notarized signatures of one percent
of the total gubernatorial votes at the last preceding general election for
minority parties and three percent or five percent for independent
candidates were not impermissible burdens on the First and Fourteenth

111. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-113(c)(2)(B) (2004) (providing that independent presidential
candidates need a petition signed by one percent of the last presidential vote cast).
112. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-62 (explaining that a new party needs signatures of one-tenth
of one percent of the number of registered voters).
113. HAW. REV. STAT. § 12-3.
114. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-201 (West 2004).
115. 415 U.S. 767, 774-76 nn.6-7 (1974) (describing the Texas ballot access laws for
minor parties and independent candidates).
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Amendment.” The Hawaii court seemed to believe that a new party in
Texas needed a one percent petition for statewide office, whereas an
independent candidate for statewide office needed a three percent or five
percent petition. This is factually wrong. Statewide independent
candidates, and new parties, needed an identical number of signatures.116
The fact that district independents needed three percent or five percent, but
never more than 500, does not show that Texas was discriminating against
independent candidates, because minor parties could not’ even qualify in
just a single congressional or legislative district. If any group was
discriminated against in Texas in 1972, it was minor parties, not
independent candidates.
The Hawaii court failed to acknowledge the most important precedent of
all, Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party.117 A
unanimous Supreme Court held that lower courts are supposed to use
common sense when they evaluate the number of signatures required for
ballot access. 118 Illinois required statewide minor party and independent
candidates to submit 25,000 signatures, but required minor party and
independent candidates for mayor of Chicago to submit approximately
42,000 (the formula for district office was five percent of the last vote cast,
and in Chicago, five percent of the last mayoral vote cast was a number
substantially higher than 25,000). 119 The Supreme Court ruled that Illinois
could not require minor party and independent candidates to collect more
signatures for an office in just part of the state, than they needed for
statewide office. 120
Similar common sense should have compelled the decision that Hawaii
has no rational need to require 3711 signatures for a single independent
presidential candidate, if the state feels that only 677 signatures are needed
116. When American Party of Texas was filed in 1972, Texas required the same deadline
and number of signatures for minor parties, independent presidential candidates, and
independent candidates for other statewide office. See id. (citing Tex. Elec. Code §§ 13.45
(for new parties), 13.50 (for all independent candidates)). In 1975, Texas repealed all
procedures for independent presidential candidates to get on the ballot, an action criticized
by the Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317 (1976). When Texas restored
such procedures in 1977, the restored procedures for independent presidential candidates
were, for the first time, more restrictive than the procedures for new party and nonpresidential independent statewide independent.
117. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
118. See id. at 186. The Court reached this conclusion without extended discussion, and
in just two sentences: “The Illinois legislature has determined that its interest in avoiding
overloaded ballots in statewide elections is served by the 25,000-signature requirement. Yet
appellant has advanced no reason, much less a compelling one, why the State needs a more
stringent requirement for Chicago.” Id.
119. Id. at 176.
120. Id. at 187.
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for an entire new party. The purpose of ballot access restrictions is to keep
the ballot from being too crowded. So if 677 signatures are sufficient to
keep the ballot uncrowded in the case of new or minor parties, there can
not’ be any sensible reason to require more than five times as many
signatures for an independent presidential candidate. A new party has the
ability to clutter up the general election ballot far more than a single
independent presidential candidate.
Similarly, if Hawaii can get along with only twenty-five signatures for
statewide independent candidates (for office other than president), how
obvious can it be that there is no need to require 145 times as many
signatures for independent presidential candidates?
In Nader v. Connor, Nader tried to show that Texas could have no
rational interest in requiring 64,077 signatures for an independent
presidential candidate, when the state only required 45,540 for a statewide
independent candidate for other office, or for a new party. 121 But the
district court and the Fifth Circuit upheld the disparity. 122 The Court said
that independent presidential candidates need not hold a convention,
whereas new and minor parties must hold precinct, county, and state
conventions. 123 The Court implied that the burden of holding conventions
cancelled out the disparity in the number of signatures.124 Texas law,
however, permits a new or minor party to hold a single precinct
convention, a single county convention, and then a state convention.125
The burden of holding three meetings (of no specified minimum number of
attendees) is obviously far, far lighter than obtaining another 20,000 valid
signatures.
As to Nader’s point, wondering why he should be required to collect
forty-one percent more signatures than an independent candidate for U.S.
Senate or other non-presidential statewide office must obtain, the district
court, and the Fifth Circuit, said not a word. If anything, independent
presidential candidates should be required to collect fewer signatures than
independent candidates for other statewide office. In Anderson v.
Celebrezze, the Court said that states have a diminished interest in keeping
independent presidential candidates off their ballots than candidates for
other office. 126

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Nader v. Connor, 332 F. Supp. 2d 982, 985 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
Id. at 992.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id. (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181.004 (Vernon 2003)).
460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983).
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IV. NADER’S LAWSUITS ON WHETHER OUT-OF-STATE CIRCULATORS
MAY WORK
Nader filed lawsuits against Arizona and Ohio, alleging that it is
unconstitutional for states to prohibit out-of-state circulators. This Article
has already discussed the Arizona decision. 127 As noted, the sole reason
for a failure to gain injunctive relief was that Nader filed the case too late
on August 16. 128 This was true for both issues in the case, out-of-state
circulators and the deadline.
Nader’s lawsuit 129 against Ohio’s ban on out-of-state circulators failed to
gain injunctive relief. The district court ruled that Ohio law, requiring
circulators to be registered voters in Ohio, is likely unconstitutional.130
This was no surprise, because the Supreme Court had invalidated a
Colorado law in 1999 that required initiative circulators to be registered
voters. 131 Ohio requires initiative circulators to be registered voters.132 As
Ohio forbids anyone from registering to vote until they have lived in the
state for at least thirty days, the registration requirement also serves as a
duration of residency requirement. 133
Why, then, did the district court fail to put Nader on the ballot? After
all, he had submitted 14,473 signatures, when only 5000 were required.134
The only basis for keeping him off the ballot was by eliminating all of the
signatures collected by circulators who supposedly were not bona fide Ohio
registrants. Because the circulators had claimed to be residents of Ohio,
the district court 135 and the Sixth Circuit 136 said that some of them had
committed fraud; therefore, the constitutional issue did not need to be
reached. Footnote fourteen of the district court decision states, “In the
Court’s view, this case is wholly different from one in which out-of-state
circulators, untainted by fraud, challenge a residency statute on First
Amendment grounds. In such a case, the Court would consider the First

127. See supra notes 74, 106, 114 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. Blankenship v. Blackwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
130. “The Court concludes that the Ohio law at issue should be reviewed under a strict
scrutiny analysis.” Id. at 922. “It appears clear that the requirement of Ohio law that
circulators be registered voters is unconstitutional.” Id. at 921-22.
131. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.06 (2005).
133. Section 3503.06 explicitly incorporates the thirty-day residency requirement into the
restriction on circulating a petition.
134. Blankenship, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 914.
135. Id. at 923.
136. Blankenship v. Blackwell, No. 04-4259, slip. op. at 2 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 2004) (on file
with author).
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Amendment issue.” 137
Nader argued in vain that no administrative body, or had ever
established that four particular circulators were not Ohio residents, and
those four alone collected more than the needed 5000 valid signatures.138
Nader asked the Supreme Court for an injunction pending appeal of his
federal Ohio case, but the Court denied the injunction. 139 Undoubtedly the
Supreme Court denied relief because of the extreme delay of the appeal to
that Court.
V. NADER’S OTHER FEDERAL BALLOT ACCESS LAWSUITS
A. North Carolina
Nader sued North Carolina, asking for an injunction to place him on the
ballot, on the grounds that the state’s existing independent candidate
petition requirements had been declared unconstitutional on July 26,
2004. 140 Under the Supreme Court case McCarthy v. Briscoe,141 when a
state’s ballot access law for an independent presidential candidate has been
deemed unconstitutional, a lower court should place an independent
presidential candidate on the ballot if the evidence shows that the candidate
has a modicum of support. “Modicum,” in this context, means “a small
amount.” Clearly, Nader enjoyed a modicum of support throughout 2004.
He filed his North Carolina lawsuit in the Middle District on September
2, 142 even though the State Board of Elections had set September 3 as the
date on which they would convene to consider Nader’s request for ballot
placement. The State Board did not make a decision on September 3, so
the Middle District court denied relief on September 3 on the grounds that
Nader hadn’t exhausted his administrative remedies. At another hearing on
September 14, the Middle District ruled that the lawsuit should have been
filed in the Eastern District,143 which contains Raleigh, the state capitol,
137. Blankenship, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 923 n.14.
138. See Nader’s Application for Stay of the Sixth Circuit decision, directed to the
Supreme Court on Oct. 22, 2004, at 13-15.
139. Blankenship v. Blackwell, 125 S. Ct. 375 (2004).
140. DeLaney v. Bartlett, NO. 1:02CV00741, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14696 (M.D.N.C.
July 26, 2004).
141. 429 U.S. 1317 (1976).
142. Nader v. Bartlett I, 1:04-cv-793 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (on file with author). The
chronology of Nader’s lawsuits and administrative hearings in North Carolina is contained
in the September 24, 2004 order of the district court in Nader v. Bartlett II, 5:04-cv-675-BR
(E.D.N.C. 2004) (on file with author).
143. One of the plaintiffs, a voter who wished to vote for Nader, lived in the Middle
District, so Nader had a plausible argument that the Middle District was proper venue.
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where the State Board of Elections “resides.” Nader filed a new lawsuit in
the Eastern District that very day, but on September 24, the Eastern District
ruled that the case had been filed too late.
Again, this conclusion sounds somewhat reasonable, until one
remembers that Nader won ballot access lawsuits in four state courts on
dates later than September 24. 144
B. Ohio Write-In Lawsuit
Nader sued Ohio (after he lost his ballot access cases in that state) in
federal court, asking that write-ins for him be counted. But, even that
injunctive relief was denied. 145 Ohio permits write-ins, but will only tally
write-ins for candidates who filed a declaration of write-in candidacy forty
days before the election.146 In 2004, that deadline fell on September 23.
At that time, Nader was on the Ohio ballot, because on September 3, the
state had determined that he had enough signatures (he was removed on
September 28 when an administrative hearing reversed that decision).147
Since Nader was on the ballot on the day the write-in declaration was due,
he believed he could not legally file as a declared write-in candidate. The
district court denied injunctive relief on the grounds that the lawsuit had
been filed too late,148 even though the lawsuit, if successful, would not
have required any changes to the ballot. Instead, it would only have
required the Secretary of State to inform the counties that Nader write-ins
should be canvassed. The order also stated, “The Court finds that because
no constitutional violation has occurred, plaintiffs will not suffer
irreparable harm,” even though five of the plaintiffs were Ohio voters who
wished to write-in Nader and desired that their vote be counted.149

Nader, however, did not contest the venue ruling.
144. These ballot access lawsuits were won in Arkansas (Populist Party of Ark. v.
Chesterfield, No. 04-994, 2004 WL 2113065 (Ark. Sept. 23, 2004)), Maine (Melanson v.
Sec’y of State, 861 A.D.2d 641 (Me. 2004)), New Mexico (Nader v. Griego, No. 28,900
(N.M. Sept. 28, 2004)) and Wisconsin (Nader v. Circuit Court, 04-2559-W (Wisc. Sep. 30,
2004)).
145. Nader v. Blackwell, No. 04-1052 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.041 (Anderson 2005). Thirty-four states will not
canvass write-ins for candidates who fail to file a declaration of write-in candidacy
sometime before the election. Ohio is one of those thirty-four states. Generally the deadline
to file such a declaration of write-in candidacy is a week or two before the election, if the
candidate is running in the November election, but Ohio’s deadline falls in late September.
147. The Ohio Supreme Court ballot access decision, Blankenship v. Blackwell, 817
N.E.2d 382, 383 (Ohio 2004), contains this chronology.
148. Nader v. Blackwell, No. 04-1052 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2004).
149. Id. at 4.
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CONCLUSION
The federal courts that considered whether to grant Nader injunctive
relief did a poor job. One district court judge took forty-one days from the
date of the hearing, to issue his ruling. 150 The district courts in Hawaii and
Illiniois may have misread American Party of Texas v. White. 151 One
district court judge misunderstood Texas election law. One district court
judge acknowledged that the law is unconstitutional but still refused relief
because of an unestablished allegation that some circulators had committed
fraud. Three district court judges, and the Seventh Circuit, said that Nader
had filed his lawsuits too late, even though he had filed them earlier in the
year than past presidential candidates who were placed on ballots by the
Supreme Court, and even though nine state courts ruled in favor of Nader
on dates even closer to the general election than the dates of these federal
decisions.
The federal courts, by denying injunctive relief, harmed voters who
desired to vote for Nader. In states in which Nader was on the ballot,
0.67% of the voters voted for Nader. In the two states in which federal
courts denied injunctive relief to Nader, and in which voters couldn’t even
cast a write-in vote for Nader and have that write-in be tallied, 6,056,916
votes for president were cast in the 2004 general election.152 Assuming
that Nader had the same level of support in the two states in which voters
could not vote for him, as he did in states where he was on the ballot, then
40,581 voters were disenfranchised by the lack of injunctive relief in those
two states (6,056,916 multiplied by 0.67% equals 40,581).
In the four states in which federal courts denied injunctive relief, but in
which Nader write-ins could be counted, Nader was credited with 17,302
votes. Those voters were also not treated equal to voters who desired to
vote for President Bush and Senator Kerry, since it is more difficult to cast
a write-in vote than to vote for a candidate listed on the ballot. And Nader
himself was disadvantaged, since if he had received the same 0.67% of the
vote in those four states that he received in states in which he was on the
ballot, he would have received 121,931 more votes.

150. The District court in Texas that handled Nader’s case, Nader v. Connor, 332 F.
Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Tex. 2004), held the hearing on July 22 but did not release its opinion
until September 1, even though the Judge had promised at the hearing to issue it the first
week in August “at the absolute latest.” See Nader’s cert. petition, no. 04-918, on page 5.
151. See Nader v. Yoshina, No. 04-00611 (D. Hi. Oct. 13, 2004) (on file with author);
Nader v. Keith, No. 04-C-4913 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004), aff’d 7th Cir., No. 04-3183.
152. For the Federal Election Commission’s official presidential returns, see 2004
Official
Presidential
General
Election
Results,
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/2004presgenresults.pdf.
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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Election
Observation Mission issued a preliminary report on the U.S. election on
November 4, 2004. The Organization for Security and Co-operation is the
formal name of the group that enforces the Helsinki Accords. The
November 4, 2004, report says, “The OSCE will issue a comprehensive
final report which will address certain issues not included in this statement,
including candidate ballot access, open voting by fax and the restricted
representation in Congress of residents of the District of Columbia.” 153 It
is likely that the final OSCE report will be critical of U.S. ballot access
laws and some of the decisions discussed in this Article.
“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at
the heart of representative government.” 154 At a time when the United
States claims that it is fighting a war in Iraq 155 to instill representative
government in that nation, it is unfortunate that it seems unwilling to
practice what it preaches.

153. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Election Observation
Mission: United States of America 2 Nov. 2004 Elections (Nov. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/11/3779_en.pdf.
154. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
155. Ballot sheets for the National Assembly election provided Iraqi voters with choices
from 111 political parties. James Glanz, From Ballot To Tally Sheet To Laptop, the Election
Results Start Coming Together, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A10.

